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CCORDING TO A QUALIFIED-AGENT account of right 
action, an action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would char-
acteristically do in the circumstances (V).1 A frequent objection to 
this account is that it gives the wrong result in cases where the agent faces 
a dilemma because of previous wrongdoing. Robert Johnson gives the 
example of the chronic liar who undertakes a series of remedial actions to 
improve his character. Commonsense tells us that he acts rightly (or does 
what he ought to do), but (V) denies this, for no virtuous agent will find 
herself in these circumstances. Johnson concludes from this that virtue 
ethics fails to make room for a genuine moral obligation to improve your 
character.2 
In Practical Intelligence and the Virtues, Daniel Russell responds to the 
“right but not virtuous” objection by drawing attention to Hursthouse’s 
distinction between action guidance (what ought to be done) and action 
assessment (what is right). Providing action guidance is a matter of help-
ing people decide what to do, whereas an account of action assessment 
concerns what it is reasonable to approve and disapprove of.3 An account 
of right action is really an account of two things, he says, and virtue ethics 
must say something about both.4 To demonstrate how action guidance 
and action assessment can come apart, Russell refers to Hursthouse’s dis-
cussion of tragic dilemmas, where all courses of action open to the agent 
may be too terrible to be described as “right,” yet where there may still be 
something he ought to do. Russell explains that we do sometimes de-
scribe such an agent as having done “the right thing,” but here the focus 
is not on the action itself, but on the agent’s decision to act: “even though 
what he did was an awful thing for anyone to have to do, he successfully 
recognized that it did have to be done.”5 By contrast, when “right” is 
used to assess an action it is used in the sense of a praiseworthy action, 
one that warrants a satisfactory review of one’s conduct, or a tick of ap-
proval.6 
In Russell’s view, Johnson’s mistake is to assume that the claim that 
the reforming liar ought to do X implies that his doing X would be right. 
If a right action is one that is fine, excellent or praiseworthy, then it is not 
necessarily one that ought to be done. Conversely, doing what one ought 
to do does not necessarily result in a right action.7 In a tragic dilemma the 
agent can do what he ought to do, yet fail to perform a right action. In 
                                                            
1 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 28. 
2 Robert Johnson, “Virtue and Right,” Ethics 113 (2003): 816-18. 
3  Daniel Russell, Practical Intelligence and the Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), p. 46. 
4 Ibid, p. 59. 
5 Ibid, pp. 49-50. 
6 Ibid, p. 49.  
7 Ibid, ch. 2.  
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the same way, Russell suggests, in situations created by previous wrong-
doing an agent can fail to act rightly even while doing what he ought to 
do. In this way he believes that the virtue ethicist can avoid Johnson’s 
objection. 
The problem with this response is that it only takes care of one side 
of Johnson’s objection. It shows why the virtue ethicist’s claim, namely 
that the chronic liar fails to act rightly, is not altogether implausible. 
However, it ignores the part of the objection that relates to moral obliga-
tion: Does virtue ethics provide adequate action guidance in dilemmas 
created by previous wrongdoing? One possibility, which is suggested by 
Hursthouse in her discussion of tragic dilemmas, is simply to say that one 
ought to do what a virtuous agent would do in the circumstances (D).8 
However, in dilemmas created by previous wrongdoing, (D) meets the 
same problem encountered by (V), namely that a virtuous agent would 
not find himself in these circumstances in the first place. 
The question, then, is whether virtue ethics gives us any grounds for 
claiming that the chronic liar ought to undertake a series of remedial ac-
tions. Russell gives no indication that he is in favor of abandoning the 
language of obligation, but he has very little to say when it comes to 
providing an account of moral obligation.9 His proposed solution to the 
“right but not virtuous” objection requires a move away from thinking of 
action guidance in terms of the virtuous agent. He claims that “right” in 
(V) functions as an action-assessing concept, not an action-guiding one,10 
and this suggests that we need a separate account of action guidance, one 
that does not make reference to the virtuous agent. However, when Rus-
sell briefly addresses the issue of action guidance later on, the virtuous 
agent reappears: 
 
talk of “the virtuous person” models practical problems by focusing attention 
away from a decision procedure for solving the problem and onto an approach 
to the problem that takes as central the way in which one makes it, carries it 
through, etc., including the idea that virtuous action includes skilful practical 
reasoning on the part of the one facing the problem.11 
 
The idea, then, is not for the non-virtuous agent to do what a virtuous 
agent would do, but to attend to the reasons to which the virtuous person 
is appropriately responsive. This suggests an approach to decision-making 
that is similar to the one proposed by Valerie Tiberius, with which Russell 
says he is “broadly in agreement,” namely: 
 
(RD) A decision is right iff it is the decision in accordance with 
the reasons that would guide the actions of a virtuous agent.12 
                                                            
8 Hursthouse, p. 79. 
9 On p. 52 Russell notes that he agrees with Johnson that virtue ethics “must make room 
for a genuine moral obligation to improve your character,” and that steps so taken are 
what one “morally ought to do” in such circumstances.  
10 Ibid, p. 52. 
11 Ibid, p. 138. 
12  Valerie Tiberius, “How to Think About Virtue and Right,” Philosophical Papers 37 
(2006): 247-65. See Russell, p. 56. 
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Is this account plausible? The move from thinking of a right decision as 
one that a virtuous agent would make in the circumstances to thinking of 
it as one that is in accordance with the virtuous agent’s reasons is a move 
towards greater abstraction. As such, in dilemmas created by previous 
wrongdoing, it has an important advantage, namely that the agent need 
not find himself in exactly the same circumstances that a virtuous person 
might find himself; the circumstances only need to be relevantly similar. 
For example, in his attempt to improve his character the chronic liar 
should attend to the same kinds of reasons that feature in the delibera-
tions of virtuous agents, such as, “I must take responsibility for my ac-
tions” and “It is appropriate to ask for help when facing difficult chal-
lenges.” 
However, the appeal to the virtuous agent’s reasons also presents us 
with a number of problems. In the remainder of this paper I discuss what 
I consider to be the main difficulties for such an approach. The first con-
cerns the question of whether (RD) still constitutes a distinctively virtue–
ethical approach to action guidance. If one’s decision-making is to be 
guided by general reasons such as, “I have made a promise,” “They need 
my help,” “I owe it to her,” etc., then it appears to be very similar to the 
approach suggested by deontologists. Consider Hursthouse’s example of 
the philanderer who has impregnated two women, A and B, after promis-
ing to marry each of them.13 According to the deontologist, the philan-
derer has a number of conflicting obligations: to keep his promise to A, 
to keep his promise to B, to support A and her child, and to support B 
and her child. So he finds himself in an irresolvable dilemma: he has rea-
sons to marry A and not B, and he has reasons to marry B and not A. But 
consider, now, that B makes it clear that she no longer wants or needs his 
support. In this case he is “let off the hook”; the overriding (or actual) 
obligation – what he ought to do – is to marry and support A and her 
child. Principles provide the agent with reasons to act in certain ways, so 
the deontologist can agree with the proposed approach to decision-
making (RD). What is needed, as Tiberius puts it, is for the virtue ethicist 
to show that there is a genuinely virtue-centered interpretation of (RD), 
in other words, that one cannot define the reasons of the virtuous inde-
pendently of characterizations of virtuous agents.14 
The second problem is whether talk of the virtuous agent, conceived 
as modeling practical problems, gives adequate guidance to non-virtuous 
agents. On a fairly general level, we can accept that the kinds of situations 
that non-virtuous agents face are not altogether different from those that 
virtuous people face, such as deciding whether to get married, keep a 
promise or help someone in need. In our example, the philanderer may 
consider the same kinds of reason, such as “I should keep my promises,” 
“I should take responsibility for my actions,” “B does not want to marry 
me” and “A is in more dire need than B.” Of course, general reasons still 
need to be specified, and taking these reasons seriously will look very dif-
                                                            
13 Hursthouse, p. 66ff. 
14 Tiberius, pp. 258-59. 
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ferent in the case of the chronic liar than they would in the case of a vir-
tuous agent. Nevertheless, the virtuous agent’s reasons could well lead the 
philanderer in the wrong direction. Imagine, for example, that the philan-
derer is hopelessly addicted to drugs. The right decision in such a situa-
tion, I believe, is not to marry anyone, at least not until he has conquered 
his addiction, and the reasons that will guide him to this decision would 
be things like: “In my present state I will be a terrible husband and father,” 
“I have no prospect of finding a good job,” “They will be better off 
without me” and “I have to take care of myself first.” 
I would therefore suggest, contra Russell, that the non-virtuous will 
not always be guided towards good decision-making by the kinds of rea-
sons that virtuous agents are responsive to. Instead, in some cases the 
best guidance will come from a desire to avoid acting in ways that are 
characteristic of vicious people. Consider Johnson’s example of the man 
who is at war with malicious or cowardly desires15 and has to decide 
whether to accept an invitation to a party. A virtuous agent’s reasons for 
acting, such as, “It would be so lovely to see everyone,” could well point 
him in the wrong direction. Instead, we can imagine his reasons for acting 
being quite different from the virtuous agent’s reasons, for example, “If I 
accept the invitation I will probably end up drinking too much,” “I will 
be tempted to steal something” or “I will lose my temper if I see her with 
her new lover.” When it is not possible to perform a right (excellent or 
virtuous) action, then, one may be best advised to focus one’s efforts on 
avoiding actions that are wrong (characteristic of the vicious). Aristotle 
suggests this approach when he advises us to be aware of our own weak-
nesses: we should “drag ourselves in the contrary direction; for we shall 
arrive at the mean by pressing well away from our failing.”16 It appears, 
then, that the non-virtuous agent does not obtain action guidance from 
(V) but from its corollary, (W): An action is wrong iff it is what a vicious 




I have tried to show that for Russell’s response to the “right but not vir-
tuous” objection to be complete, it needs to include a virtue–ethical ac-
count of how one ought to act. If, in response to this objection, the virtue 
ethicist draws attention to the distinction between action assessment and 
action guidance, claiming that he uses “right action” in the sense of what 
is excellent or praiseworthy rather than what ought to be done, then the 
original objection gives way to a new one, namely that virtue ethics does 
not provide adequate action guidance in dilemmas created by previous 
wrongdoing. Russell suggests an approach to decision-making that takes 
the virtuous agent as modeling deliberation about ethical problems rather 
than solving them. This approach still has to be developed in more detail, 
but it faces at least two potential problems, namely that it no longer 
seems to be distinctively virtue ethical, and that it does not always provide 
                                                            
15 Johnson, p. 820ff. 
16 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1109a20-b20. 
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the right kind of guidance to non-virtuous agents. I suggest an alternative 
approach, which is for the non-virtuous to focus on avoiding actions that 
are characteristic of the vicious.17 
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17  I discuss this approach in more detail in Van Zyl, “Right Action and the Non-
Virtuous Agent,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1) (2011): 80-92 and Van Zyl, “Quali-
fied-Agent Virtue Ethics,” South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (2) (2011): 219-28. 
 
